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In early December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This dichotomy highlights the defining tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—though how this squares with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This shift is major, but observers warn it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Apathy and Friction

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Action

A similar tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.